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Professionalism
in tribal jurisdictions
BY MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER
American Indian law is an important area
of law. There are 12 federally recognized
Indian tribes in the state of Michigan.1 Indian tribes throughout the United States
do business in Michigan. Indian tribal
governments and corporations employ
hundreds of thousands of non-Indians and
received billions in federal pandemic relief. Indian gaming generated nearly $40
billion in revenues nationally last year.
Still, many lawyers ignore the field or
claim ignorance about the basic precepts
of federal Indian law.

This article will canvass several themes of
professionalism in tribal practice, drawing
from this author’s tribal law experience over
the last few decades. Many lawyers undervalue — and even disrespect — tribal governance. This lack of professionalism has
significant costs to tribal governments, tribal
business, and their business partners.

SKEPTICISM OF INHERENT
TRIBAL POWERS AS INCIVILITY
As I was completing my final law school
exams in 1997, the United States Supreme

Court issued a decision devastating the
prospects of tribal governments and tribal
justice systems to regulate the activities of
nonmembers in Indian country in Strate v.
A-1 Contractors.2 That case involved a car
wreck on an Indian reservation in North Dakota. The plaintiff was a non-Indian woman
who married into a large Native family. The
defendant was a nonmember-owned company. In a unanimous and casually cruel
opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
the Court held that since both parties were
nonmembers, the tribe and its justice system
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NHBP Indians attend a traditional tribal ceremony.

were “strangers” to the accident and rejected tribal court jurisdiction over the claim.
Later, I took my first job out of law school
with the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona. At
that time, Pascua had little common law.
A large part of my job as in-house counsel was negotiating contracts on behalf of
tribal procurement with outside vendors,
hoping to steer any conflicts to tribal court.
I “negotiated” dozens of contracts with the
tribe’s business partners, but they were
hardly negotiations. Vendors rarely consented to tribal court jurisdiction or tribal law
as the governing law. Some of this had to
do with the tribe’s bargaining power, but
much of it had to do with Strate. Counsel
representing the vendors argued to me that
the Court had eliminated tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers. That’s not what the Court
said — nonmembers could still consent in
writing — but counsel for nonmembers also
knew if they didn’t consent, they lost nothing. From their point of view, Strate gave
nonmembers license to roam unfettered. My
tribal client could either allow nonmember
vendors onto the reservation to do as they
wished or exclude itself from business. At
that time, my client had little choice but to
accede to these prejudices.
A few years later, it got worse. The Court
issued another tribal jurisdiction decision in
2001 in Nevada v. Hicks, rejecting a tribal court’s authority to exercise jurisdiction
under 42 USC 1983 over state officials.3
Once again, the decision was unanimous.
This time, there was a concurring opinion
by Justice David H. Souter roundly condemning tribal laws and tribal courts. Justice Souter wrote that tribal law was “un-

usually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”4
He described tribal law as “frequently unwritten,” the product of “customs, traditions,
and practices ... handed down orally or by
example from one generation to another.”5
This was the second Supreme Court writing
in four years disrespecting and gutting tribal powers over nonmembers — both written
by two different justices supposedly to the
center-left of the Court.
As a tribal practitioner, Justice Souter’s description of tribal law was news to me. In
2001, I was working in house for the Suquamish Tribe on Puget Sound in Washington.
My experience working with the Pascua
and Suquamish (and in between, the Hoopa Valley Tribe in northern California) was
completely different from the story Justice
Souter told. These tribes took their cultures,
customs, and traditions very seriously. In
child welfare cases, property rights cases,
and other cases involving only tribal members, tribal custom law that could be difficult
for outsiders to understand might apply. But
in relations with nonmembers, tribal law
was written down — and in English. Where
tribal law was silent, we looked to state
commercial law and state court procedures
for guidance, usually adopting blackletter
law from the Restatements of Law. The last
thing my tribal clients wanted was for tribal
customs and traditions to interfere with the
business dealings critical to funding basic
tribal governmental services like health
care, public safety, and child welfare.
Following that decision, when I worked
with counsel for my tribal clients’ business
partners and vendors, they were often radicalized by Strate and Justice Souter’s con-
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currence in Hicks. From their perspective,
not only was tribal power over nonmembers
unnecessary to tribal governance but was
dangerous to nonmembers. The Supreme
Court said so. Evidence to the contrary often was irrelevant. Outside counsel became
far more aggressive with me.
A short while after Hicks, I returned home to
work in-house for my own tribe, the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians in Peshawbestown. One attorney
representing a vendor demanded that I provide him a hard copy of every tribal council
resolution and ordinance and every single
tribal court decision before he would even
talk to me. A county attorney told me he
could not discuss an agreement to plow
snow at a tribal elder’s complex because,
in his words, Hicks had overruled Worcester v. Georgia, an 1832 decision acknowledging tribal sovereignty and treaty rights
over Indian lands.6 Yet another attorney,
this time representing a tribal member in an
employment suit against the tribe in a tribal
forum, told me he would win a $1,000,000

The views expressed in “In Perspective,” as well as other expressions of opinions published in the Bar Journal from time to time, do not necessarily state or reflect
the official position of the State Bar of Michigan, nor does their publication constitute an endorsement of the views expressed. They are the opinions of the authors
and are intended not to end discussion, but to stimulate thought about significant issues affecting the legal profession, the making of laws, and the adjudication
of disputes.
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A recurring theme in the Supreme Court’s
decisions on tribal powers and jurisdiction
is concern for nonmembers being unfairly
victimized by confusion around tribal laws.
Justice Souter’s worry for “outsiders” being
subjected to tribal laws was just one example. As I drove in a moving van with my
father from Ann Arbor to Tucson, Arizona,
to start my legal career at Pascua, the Supreme Court issued a decision affirming
tribal sovereign immunity in Kiowa Tribe
v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.7 I was
excited to see the Court actually rule in favor of tribal immunity, but Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion ridiculed the
notion of tribal immunity, asserting that it
developed “almost by accident.”8 Worse,
he argued that Congress should abrogate
tribal immunity in part because “[i]n this
economic context, immunity can harm those
who are unaware that they are dealing with
a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity,

judgment against the tribe as soon as he
got the case moved to state court, where
he believed the law was fair. Ultimately,
each of those attorneys walked back their
demands, but not before I wasted an enormous amount of time educating my friends
on the other side.

IGNORANCE OF TRIBAL
LAW AS COUNSEL’S LACK
OF DILIGENCE
These uncivil incidents were relatively unusual; after all, most of the work of in-house
counsel is not in dealing with nonmembers
but with the tribal client. Still, these incidents
evidence a lack of diligence on the part of
counsel for my client’s legal adversaries. It
is a lawyer’s job to learn the law on behalf
of their client, not to demand legal research
from opposing counsel, misrepresent precedent, or fail to research basic tribal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity questions.
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Michigan's 12 federally recognized Indian tribes: 1. Bay Mills Chippewa Indian Community | 2. The Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians | 3. Hannahville Indian Community | 4. Nottawaseppi Huron
Band of Potawatomi Indians | 5. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community | 6. Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians | 7. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians | 8. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians |
9. Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians | 10. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe | 11. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians | 12. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (Gun Lake Tribe)

or who have no choice in the matter, as in
the case of tort victims.”9 Ultimately, as my
friend Prof. Bill Wood pointed out years later, tribal immunity was no accident.10
Moreover, after careful consideration and
multiple contentious hearings, Congress decided not to undo tribal immunity, which the
Court acknowledged 16 years later in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community.11 The
Court’s signaling of disdain and skepticism
of tribal immunity feeds practitioners’ attitudes about tribal economic development.
Throughout my career as in-house counsel, attorneys for my tribal clients’ business
partners sometimes insisted that my client
abrogate its immunity entirely before they
would even talk about a contract. These attorneys advised me that it was best to drop
sovereign immunity or no one would ever
do business with the tribe. These attorneys
either talked their own clients out of a business partner by insisting on a complete tribal waiver or eventually walked back their
initial demands, tails between their legs,
when they learned about the possibility of
a contract-based limited waiver of tribal immunity. These attorneys wasted everyone’s
time and money.
But many lawyers continued to engage me
and my client in good faith. In the early
2000s, my client and the other Michigan
tribes were negotiating with the state government over taxes12 in light of a groundbreaking court rule cocreated by tribal
and state court judges in the 1990s.13 The
Michigan tribal courts and Michigan Supreme Court had agreed on a reciprocal
court rule in which tribal and state courts
would grant comity to each other’s judgments, awards, and other orders so long as
the other court system would do the same.14
The resulting state court rule formed the basis for a provision in Michigan’s tribal-state
tax agreements a decade later where the
state agreed to litigate tax disputes in the
tribal courts.15 Michigan probably is the
only state government to consent to tribal
court jurisdiction. The state’s attorneys zealously advocated for their client but did so
in respect for the sovereign prerogatives of
Michigan’s tribal nations. Once again, my
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lived experience as a tribal law practitioner
was the polar opposite of the way the U.S.
Supreme Court saw tribal law and courts.

OBSERVATIONS
AS A TRIBAL JUDGE
Congress has been supportive of tribal
self-determination for about the last half
century, but in the last decade or so Congress recognized more tribal authority
over nonmembers, primarily through the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization
Acts of 2013 and 2022.16 The Supreme
Court’s aggressive rhetoric skeptical of
tribal powers has waned somewhat as
well with the Court even recently acknowledging tribal powers over nonmembers in
limited contexts.17
From my perspective as a tribal judge, I
have seen tribal governmental powers litigated extensively. In 2013, I served as
a special judge for the Lac du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
in Wisconsin. The tribe’s economic development arm, known in Indian law circles
as an economic development corporation
(EDC), brought suit in tribal court against its
business partners (and their counsel) over a
large casino development deal gone bad.
The EDC hoped to short circuit federal or
state court claims, but the transaction documents included a forum selection clause
allowing for Wisconsin federal or state jurisdiction, with Wisconsin law controlling.
The nonmember defendants in tribal court
moved to dismiss, primarily relying on the
forum selection clause.
Interestingly, Wisconsin law was fairly liberal on the interpretation of forum selection clauses, allowing for parties to select
a forum other than the one(s) delineated in
the transaction documents so long as the
clause did not explicitly prohibit an additional forum (in this case, the tribal court
forum). Since the transaction documents
ordered me as judge to apply Wisconsin
law, I did so, and applied the more liberal rule from Lake of the Torches Economic
Development Corporation v. Saybrook Tax
Exempt Investors, LLC.18 In short, I declined

to dismiss the action on the pleadings.
It all came down to use of passive voice
(legal writing students pay heed) in very
hastily drafted transaction documents. Perhaps with more development of the record,
it would come to pass that the EDC really
intended for the forum selection clause to
exclude tribal courts, but it was far from obvious based on the text of the transaction
documents alone.
The nonmember companies then sued in
federal court to enjoin the tribal parties from
invoking tribal jurisdiction. They prevailed,
with the district court casually denigrating
the tribal judge as a “blogger” who once
published a law review article critical of
federal courts.19 The federal courts chose
not to follow Wisconsin law on forum selection clauses, instead choosing to apply their
own precedent, leading to the opposite outcome I reached.20 So be it.
Following that litigation from afar, I was
surprised to see my name in the district
court and appellate opinions.21 How odd.
Later, I learned the nonmember companies, perhaps emboldened by the district
court judge, used me and my writings in
what appears to be an effort to denigrate
the fairness of the tribal justice system.22
No party challenged my professionalism
in tribal court but in federal court, tactics
seemingly differ.23 After all, Justice Souter’s concurrence in Hicks gave attorneys
license to do so.
That said, I think there has been a gradual shift in attitudes about tribal powers.
In 2018, serving on the Nottawaseppi
Huron Band of the Potawatomi Supreme
Court, my colleagues and I decided Spurr
v. Spurr, a case involving the power of
the tribal court to issue a protection order against a nonmember who lived 100
miles from the reservation.24 We invoked a
federal statute granting full faith and credit to tribal civil protection orders against
nonmember harassers.25 The nonmember
brought suit in federal court to challenge
the order and, implicitly, the authority of
Congress to recognize tribal powers; this
was exactly the kind of case the Supreme
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Court was likely to review with an eye
toward undercutting tribal powers. But instead, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed tribal powers, the
Supreme Court declined the nonmember’s
petition for certiorari.26 Perhaps a corner
had been turned.
Even more recently, I have had the privilege of serving on tribal appellate cases
involving nonmember defendants challenging tribal court jurisdiction. The first,
Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians v. Donius,
decided in 2020, affirmed the power of
the tribe to inspect nonmember-owned
property it suspected of being the source
of pollution.27 Serving on the Rincon court
with me were retired federal court judges
James Ware and Arthur J. Gajarsa. The
second, Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
v. Lexington Insurance Company, decided
in 2022, affirmed the jurisdiction of the
tribal court over a suit brought by the tribe
against its insurance company over COVID
19-related business losses.28 On the Cabazon tribal appellate court with me were
Kevin K. Washburn, dean of the University
of Iowa Law School, and Alexander Tallchief Skibine, professor at the University of
Utah School of Law. In both cases, counsel for both sides exuded professionalism.
Both cases are pending in federal court so
I cannot speak further on them. However,
my curiosity as to their outcomes is piqued,
of course.
In 2011, I proposed to the membership of
the American Law Institute a restatement
project on federal Indian law. The first comment from the audience was not positive.
The commentator asked how there could
be a restatement of blackletter law when
“the embers of sovereignty have long since
grown cold.”29 I was told to expect skepticism from some members of the institute.
Being used to questions like that from my
days as in-house counsel for Indian tribes,
I answered and we moved on. It was the
last time anyone asked a question like that
during the entire project, which we just
completed.30 The law is the law. Tribal sovereignty is a real thing. Professionals realizing that learn and react appropriately.
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Matthew L.M. Fletcher is the Harry Burns
Hutchins Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of American Culture at the University of
Michigan. An enrolled citizen of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians,
he serves as an appellate judge for four Michigan
tribes. The Michigan Supreme Court recently appointed Fletcher to the Michigan Task Force on
Well-Being in the Law.
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